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Abstract 
As global sea levels and natural resource demands rise, people around the world are increasingly protesting envi-
ronmental threats to their lives and livelihoods. What are the conditions under which these peaceful environmental 
protests are violently repressed? This paper uses the random forest algorithm to conduct an event analysis of grass-
roots environmental protests around the world. Utilizing a database of 175 grassroots environmental protests, we 
found that: (1) a large proportion (37 %) of the protests involved violent repression; (2) most of the violence (56 %) 
was directed against marginalized groups; and (3) violence was geographically concentrated the global south in Latin 
America and Asia. The primary predictors of violence were political empowerment, GDP per capita, industry type, 
the presence of marginalized groups, and geographic region. Our analysis reveals a complex relationship between 
governance, resource extraction, and international funding that often resulted in human rights violations against 
marginalized groups.
© 2016 Poulos and Haddad. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International 
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any 
medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons 
license, and indicate if changes were made.
Background
Grassroots environmental protests represent a key mech-
anism for local populations to resist the negative effects 
of anthropogenic environmental hazards. However, these 
peaceful protests are sometimes repressed using violent 
means. The goal of this article is to identify the condi-
tions under which peaceful environmental protests are 
more likely to be violently repressed and generate policy 
recommendations that could reduce or eliminate that 
violence.
Previous research has identified a number of factors 
related to the identity of the protesters, the content and 
duration of the protest, and its socio-political context that 
can affect the probability of violent repression. Numer-
ous studies about Not In My Back Yard (NIMBY) politics 
have found that states and corporations commonly target 
vulnerable communities as site locations for environmen-
tally hazardous projects, so those types of communities 
are more likely to be engaged in environmental protests 
and more likely to be violently repressed than better-
resourced communities in the same countries (Adeola 
2000; McGurty 1997; Rabe 1994; Roberts and Ash 2009). 
Scholars have also found that extractive industry projects 
are more often associated with violent repression than 
other types of industries (Downey et  al. 2010; Blanton 
and Blanton 2009). Researchers have found when the two 
factors combine, when communities containing margin-
alized groups (defined herein as ethnic minorities or eco-
nomically disadvantaged groups) protest natural resource 
extraction, they are particularly likely to be violently 
repressed (Koopmans and Rucht 2002; Bernauer et  al. 
2012; Homer-Dixon 1994). Scholars have also found that 
protest duration (Box-Steffensmeier et  al. 2003) and the 
presence of documented human health hazards on site 
(Zheng and Liu 2013; Fagin 2013) can influence the like-
lihood of violent repression. Some scholars have found 
that violent repression of peaceful protests is more com-
mon in poor, authoritarian states that lack adequate legal 
protections than it is in rich, democratic countries with 
robust legal systems (Poe et al. 1999; Weede 1987; Besley 
and Persson 2011).
Thus far, research on violent repression of peaceful 
environmental protests has commonly used a case study 
methodology, which can help develop theories about the 
conditions that might result in violence against peaceful 
protesters, but cannot test those theories (Adeola 2000; 
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Roberts and Ash 2009; Downey et  al. 2010). Large-n 
research about violent repression has tended to analyze 
conflicts at the national level rather than local conflicts. 
While it is sometimes the case that grassroots environ-
mental protests can transform into or combine with 
regime-threatening social movements (Haddad 2014), 
that outcome is unusual; locally-focused protests are 
much more common. Event analysis focusing on grass-
roots environmental protests has the potential to explain 
the interaction of subnational, national, and international 
factors related to the violent repression of peaceful pro-
tests (Bond et al. 2003; Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2002; 
Koopmans and Rucht 2002).
No prior research has employed a large-n statistical 
analysis to identify which factors and factor combinations 
are the most important in determining the likelihood 
that a grassroots environmental protest will be violently 
repressed. We employ the random forest algorithm using 
a suite of key violent repression predictor variables from 
the literature to examine the mechanisms underscoring 
violent repression in grassroots environmental protests 
using a database of environmental protests from around 
the world. We then use those results to develop a series of 
policy recommendations intended to reduce the rate and 
intensity of violence directed toward peaceful protesters.
Methods
Environmental protest database
To investigate the factors influencing violent outcomes in 
environmental protests, we compiled a global database of 
175 grassroots environmental protest cases from a pool 
of 35,472 periodical publication search results from 1965 
to 2013 using the Lexis-Nexis Academic (www.lexis-
nexis.com) and Factiva (http://global.factiva.com) media 
databases. Factiva continuously archives periodical data 
from more than 32,000 sources from nearly every coun-
try worldwide in 28 languages, including over 450 con-
tinuously updated newswires (sources can be accessed 
here: http://www.proquest.com/documents/Title_List_-_
Factiva.html?docID=242334851). Lexis-Nexis continu-
ously archives news information from over 10,000 media 
sources (sources listed here: http://amdev.net/rpt_down-
load.php). Together, they represent the most compre-
hensive databases of media coverage available. Media 
publications are useful because they provide information 
about large numbers of events and they are well-known 
for documenting social movement dynamics (Earl et  al. 
2004). While such event data can suffer from coverage 
bias (Ortiz et  al. 2005; Barranco and Wisler 1999), they 
remain one of the only sources of data on protest events. 
To minimize biases and accuracy issues resulting from 
our use of a media-derived dataset, we: (1) searched 
for articles using multiple media database archives, (2) 
only included cases that were covered by more than one 
media source, and (3) confirmed and supplemented the 
information reported in the articles using ancillary infor-
mation obtained through online sources (i.e. a series of 
web searches using Google to confirm separately that the 
event happened and to identify additional details about 
each protest event that were coded in the database as 
listed in Table 1). Ancillary data searches were performed 
as a means for completely coding the database because 
not all information in the database was directly stated in 
the short newspaper articles. If we could not find com-
plete information to code the case completely in the 
database, we did not include the case in the study. Infor-
mation coded using web information was included only 
if it was reported in more than one online search result. 
This case search methodology likely overlooked some 
environmental protest events that were suppressed by 
local governments and not reported by newspapers. For 
example, our sample size in the Middle East was quite 
low, probably because of poor reporting of protest events. 
Yet, even working within those limitations, the two data-
bases we selected have the best world coverage of news 
events available, and they likely provided a representative 
sample of violent repression of grassroots environmental 
protests at regional- and global-scales.
We searched Lexis-Nexis and Factiva databases for a 
series of keywords associated with grassroots environ-
mental protest based on a topic search of the environ-
mental politics literature (Snow et al. 2008; Fillieule and 
Jiménez 2003; Dalton et  al. 2003; Koopmans and Rucht 
2002), which returned a total of 35,472 articles, which 
we scanned individually for grassroots environmen-
tal protest event data to build the final 175 case data-
base. Search terms included: ‘grassroots environmental 
protest’ and the word ‘protest’ in conjunction with the 
terms ‘nuclear’, ‘pollution’, ‘conservation’, ‘environmental’, 
‘wildlife preserve’, ‘toxic waste,’ ‘land fill,’ ‘mining,’ ‘dam,’ 
‘hydroelectric,’ and ‘wind energy’. Protests were excluded 
from the study if they (1) failed to demonstrate evidence 
of locally-generated activism (i.e. grassroots), (2) lacked 
sufficient qualitative information about protest charac-
teristics, or (3) appeared in fewer than two newspaper 
articles. Cases were then categorized into two groups: 
protests that remained nonviolent throughout and cases 
where some form of violence against activists occurred. 
Violence included any form of injury ranging from beat-
ings to death.
The potential explanatory variables included in this 
study were chosen based on their prevalence in the news-
paper articles and their prior identification as important 
predictors of environmental protest success by other 
prior researchers (Ash 2011; Aldrich 2008; Rabe 1994; 
McGurty 1997). The authors were entirely responsible 
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for coding the database. We attempted to reduce coding 
biases by taking a random sample of 25  % of the study 
cases and performing reciprocal recoding as a reliabil-
ity test, which resulted in no significant changes to the 
database based on a general linear model analysis of the 
changes in variable frequency (P > 0.001).
For each protest case, newspaper articles were gleaned 
for information on potentially important attributes that 
could play roles in violent outbreaks based on our review 
of the literature. For each case, we used the rubric in 
Table  1 to code each case for a range of characteristics 
that could contribute to violent episodes in environmen-
tal protests. Each case contained full attribute records for 
each potential predictor variable, which restricted our 
full dataset to 175 cases.
We coded the dependent variable, violence, as a binary 
variable. If protests were peaceful and authorities used 
peaceful, lawful means of managing and dispersing the 
protests, the event was coded as not violent. If there was 
any physical violence at all against protesters, ranging 
from roughing up to beatings and murder, the protest 
was coded as violent.
Regime type was determined using Freedom House’s 
Freedom in the World report, which rates countries as 
free, partly free, and not free according to a number of 
measures related to political rights and civil liberties. A 
number of indices that evaluate democratic freedoms 
on a country-by-country basis, yet most of them remain 
highly correlated (Zheng and Liu 2013). We selected 
the Freedom House Database because of its wide use in 
scholarship and its long record of historical data, which 
begin in 1972 (Freedom House 2013) and allowed us to 
code for democratic freedoms over the exact years of all 
of the cases included in our study.
To gain a more nuanced measure of state propensity 
toward repression we also utilized the CIRI Human 
Rights Dataset. This dataset has been widely used in 
human right research (Cingranelli and Richards 2010). 
From this dataset we utilized the empowerment variable 
that measures government respect for five human rights 
(movement, speech, worker’s rights, political participa-
tion, and freedom of religion). The CIRI empowerment 
index was coded using the mean values over the duration 
of each protest event. Since the CIRI empowerment 
index includes measures of freedom of speech, it also 
helps mitigate our study against the possibility that our 
measures of violence against protesters are actually 
measuring a greater willingness of the press to report 
Table 1 Variables
a CIRI data and documentation can be found here: http://www.humanrightsdata.com
b World Bank Data can be found at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD
Violence Binary variable, coded yes if there was any kind of physical violence 
ranging from beatings to death
Empowerment CIRI Index’s New Empowerment Rights Indexa
GDP per capita World Bank Datab
Industry protested against Chemical industry, development (construction or land clearing), hydroelec-
tric, logging, mining, nuclear power, nuclear weapons, water, petroleum, 










Taken from United Nations (2012)
Project funded with international money Coded yes if there was any international funding (e.g., multinational corpo-
rate involvement or international aid)
Protest duration Number of years
Documented human health hazards of surrounding community Yes or no
Governance Free, partly free, or not free
Involvement of marginalized groups (defined as economically,  
socially, and politically disempowered people)
Yes or no
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protests/violence rather than greater incidence of pro-
test/violence. While other variables in the CIRI dataset, 
such as the Physical Integrity Rights Index or Torture, 
might have been appropriate in theoretical terms, it is 
likely that the events of violence against protesters col-
lected in our dataset would also have been picked up by 
the PIRI measure, creating an endogeneity problem.1
GDP per capita was measured using World Bank Data 
(data.worldbank.org) using the same coding methodol-
ogy as employed in the CIRI empowerment index (i.e. 
mean values over the duration of each protest event). We 
also coded the industry that was primarily related to the 
protest: chemical industry, hydroelectric, logging, min-
ing, nuclear power, petroleum, waste disposal, or wind 
energy. We had an additional category of development 
that we coded within the industry variable to cover the 
handful of cases that could not be attributed to a par-
ticular industry and involved large construction projects, 
usually highways but also bridges, railways, and tourist 
resorts.
Marginalized groups were coded as positive if the con-
flict involved any marginalized groups. Marginalized 
groups were always economically, socially, and politically 
disempowered people. In most cases they were also eth-
nic minorities. Geographic region was coded using the 
United Nations geographic designations (United Nations 
2012). International funding was coded as positive if 
there was evidence of international money involved in 
the issue under protest (multinational corporations were 
the most common source; occasionally projects were 
funded through international funding organizations such 
as the World Bank). The protest duration was measured 
as the number of years from the start of the protest to 
its conclusion. If the conflict continued to the present, 
the duration of the protest was measured from the start 
of the protest to 2013, when we collected the data. We 
also coded for the documented presence of human health 
hazards in the protest events because the prevalence of 
human health hazards at a site can serve as a catalyst 
for grassroots protest (Zheng and Liu 2013; Fagin 2013). 
Human health hazards were coded as positive if we could 
find scientific evidence that there was a human health 
hazard related to the specific conflict event.
Statistical analysis
All statistical analyses were performed using the R 
Statistical Language using the party package (R Devel-
opment Core Team 2015). We used random forests 
(RF) (Breiman 2001; R Development Core Team 2015) 
to identify explanatory protest characteristics that 
1 For example, the violence against the Ogoni people in Nigeria as a result 
of their protests against Shell Oil certainly contributed to Nigeria’s high ter-
rorism rankings in the 1990s.
differentiated cases where grassroots environmen-
tal protests were violently repressed and cases that 
remained nonviolent throughout. The model incorpo-
rated a total of 9 potential predictor variables to dif-
ferentiate the protest cases into violent or non-violent 
groups.
The RF classification algorithm is an extension of 
the classification and regression trees (CART) (Brei-
man 1984). Classification and regression trees have 
been widely used to group two or more known classes 
of observations based on a suite of predictor variables. 
Classification using CART is achieved through recursive 
partitioning of the dataset into successively more homo-
geneous groups. The results are homogeneous subsets of 
the data based on a series of splits using all of the pre-
dictor variables, where the best tree structure is deter-
mined by the Gini Index. We used the cforest function 
in the party package to build our random forest model 
which using conditional permutation importance. Ran-
dom forest in this implementation produces multiple 
CART-like tree classifiers, each based on sub-sampling 
without replacement (Hothorn et  al. 2006). The advan-
tage of using the ctree function in the party package over 
the original random forest implementation by Breiman 
(2001) is that it produces unbiased individual trees.
We built a random forest model of 10,000 trees to esti-
mate the predictor variable importance for violent and 
nonviolent environmental protests. The random number 
of predictor variables included in each split (mtry) was 
three which was the square root of the total number of 
predictor variables as recommended by Breiman (Strobl 
et  al. 2008). We also performed a sensitivity analysis 
for different numbers of trees and mtry values, but few 
changes in model output occurred for mtry ranging from 
2 to 10, so the final model used the mtry default value of 
three and 10,000 trees since computation time was not a 
hindrance to model construction. Informative predictor 
variables were determined following Strobl et  al. (2008) 
who indicated that can be considered informative and 
important if their variable importance value is above the 
absolute value of the lowest negative-scoring variable. 
We also estimated various model performance param-
eters in addition to the standard variable importance 
measures produced including overall model accuracy, the 
Kappa Statistic, and the area under the curve (AUC) of 
the receiver operator characteristic.
Results and discussion
The following section discusses each of the variables in 
the study separately and highlights interactive effects. 
The most powerful predictors of violent repression of 
environmental protesters were low levels of civil liber-
ties and low economic development. The duration of 
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the protest was not a significant predictor of violence, 
which suggests that violent repression can occur in both 
intense, short-duration protests, as well as in long, multi-
year environmental protests. Industry type was also sig-
nificant; industries involving natural resource extraction 
elicited significantly more violence than other industries.
There were complex interactions in the relationships 
among regime type, presence of marginalized groups, 
geographic region, and presence of international funding 
and the use of violence against environmental protest-
ers. Marginalized groups were disproportionately victims 
of violence around the world, particularly in democratic 
countries. The most intense cases of violent repression 
(cases with five or more deaths) all involved extractive 
industries. Nearly all of them (nine of ten cases) involved 
international funding, and nine of ten cases also involved 
marginalized groups.
The random forest model accuracy assessment resulted 
in a robust model output. The overall model accuracy 
was 86.8  %. The AUC was 0.94, and the model had a 
kappa statistic of 0.72. These figures indicate good overall 
model performance.
The CIRI empowerment index was by far the best 
predictor of violent repression against grassroots envi-
ronmental protests (Fig.  1), which fits our expectations 
that countries with greater civil rights general have 
lower incidences of violent repression against protest-
ers. Empowerment was significantly lower (P < 0.0001, t 
test) in countries with violent repression than in coun-
tries where violence did not occur. This finding supports 
the voluminous research using cross-national data, which 
has shown that protection of basic civil liberties inhib-
its human rights abuse (Cross 1999; Hill and Rothchild 
1992; Keith et al. 2009).
As expected, countries with higher levels of economic 
development (as quantified by average GDP per capita) 
repressed citizens less than those with lower levels of 
development ($21,940 and $8875, respectively). This 
is not to say that violence did not occur in more devel-
oped countries, but rather that there was a general trend 
of less violent repression in more economically affluent 
geographical locations. Once again, this finding supports 
numerous studies that have demonstrated the connection 
between higher levels of GDP per capita and lower lev-
els of governmental repression (Besley and Persson 2011; 
Weede 1987; Henderson 1991).
The industry type associated with the protest was the 
third most important factor influencing violent repres-
sion. Violent repression was more prevalent in the min-
ing, hydroelectric power, and logging industries (Table 2). 
Violent repression was most common in the mining 
industry (15 cases of violence), followed by damming 
(13 cases of violence), and logging (11 cases of violence) 
(Fig. 2; Table 2). In contrast, wind energy, nuclear power, 
chemical plants, and development protests resulted in 
largely nonviolent demonstrations. Violent repression 
of protests that included marginalized groups was most 
prevalent in extractive industries including logging, 
petroleum, and mining. These findings support schol-
ars who argue that the subject/object of protest matters 
(Downey et al. 2010; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1993). In particu-
lar, our results indicate that resource extraction-related 
projects tend to be significantly more violent than other 
environment-related projects.
There are several possible reasons for why extractive 
industries, more than others, tend to be violent. Per-
haps, the high level of capital investment raises the stakes 
for industry and makes them less able to tolerate dissent 
(Gartner and Regan 1996). Perhaps, extraction indus-
tries are more prone to violence for the same reasons 
that they are prone to corruption—the industry tends to 
couple monopoly market control without accountability 
(O’Higgins 2006). Finally, it may be that the isolated geog-
raphy of resource extraction means that state capacity is 
less, making violence more possible (Wood 2010; Herre-
ros and Criado 2009). This connection between extractive 
industries and violence is important because indigenous 
groups often have contested rights over the land from 
which the natural resource is being extracted (Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights 2010–2011), 
and ethnic and economic minorities are disproportion-
ately victims when violence occurs (Downey et al. 2010).
Governmental regime type (free, partly free, or not 
free) remained an important predictor of violence even 
when CIRI’s Empowerment Index was included, sug-
gesting that democracy exerts a positive effect on the 
ability of protests to remain nonviolent, independent of 
the rights granted to citizens. Examining the data more 
closely, it becomes clear that, consistent with prior 
research, democratic countries had much higher overall 
rates of protest as compared with nondemocratic coun-
tries (Poe et  al. 1999; Weede 1987; Besley and Persson 
2011). Democracies had many more cases of peaceful, 
nonviolent protests (81 cases) than protests that involved 
violent repression (31 cases). Nondemocratic countries 
experienced nearly equal rates of nonviolent responses 
to (32 cases) and violent repression of (31 cases) peaceful 
environmental protests. There was a strong geographic 
component to the violence; violent repression was con-
centrated in Southeast Asia (6 in free countries, 9 in not 
and partly free countries) and Latin America (7 in free 
countries, 5 in not and partly free countries) (Fig.  3), 
while nonviolent responses to protests was predominant 
in North America and Europe (Fig. 4).
These findings support the literature that suggests that 
protests overall are more likely in democracies while 
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violent repression of protests is more likely in nondemo-
cratic states and transitioning democracies (Davenport 
1999; Franklin 2009; Chenoweth 2013). These findings 
also concur with scholars who argue that the external 
context of a protest is more important than the internal 
characteristics of the protest organization(s) or their tac-
tics in determining the outcome of the protest (Giugni 
2004).
Fig. 1 Factors influencing the violent repression of environmental protests. Figure lists the importance of protest characteristics that differentiated 
violent repression of grassroots environmental protests from nonviolent responses. The significance cutoff for informative explanatory variables is 
indicated by the vertical line, which represents the value above the absolute value of the lowest negative-scoring variable. Variable descriptions are 
provided in Table 1
Table 2 Prevalence of violence and involvement of marginalized groups in grassroots environmental protests by indus-
try
Percent of protests in industry  
involving…
Industry
Hydro-power Logging Mining Chemical plant Nuclear power Petroleum Waste disposal
Violent repression 52 55 50 22 20 27 19
Marginal groups 68 90 71 28 0 33 8
Violence against marginalized groups 62 100 86 25 0 75 0
International funding 40 15 64 33 20 67 15
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Our findings do not support research arguing that vio-
lent tactics by protesters play a significant role in elicit-
ing violent responses from authorities (Porta and Piazza 
2007). The large majority (72 %) of violence in the data-
set was directed against peaceful protesters who did not 
respond violently in any way. A minority (14 %) of pro-
tests involved violence on both sides (violence against the 
protesters was significantly larger than the reverse). A 
tiny minority—only five cases in the whole dataset—were 
situations where the protesters acted violently toward 
nonviolent opponents. There may be other context where 
violent tactics are causally related to violent repression, 
but in the cases of grassroots environmental protests, 
the causes of repression appear to have much more to do 
with the socio-economic context of the conflict and the 
identity of the aggrieved than protester tactics.
Marginalized groups figured prevalently in envi-
ronmental protest overall and in protests with vio-
lence against activists in particular. Just under half of 
our cases worldwide involved marginalized groups 
(45  %). Consistent with the voluminous environmen-
tal justice literature, marginal communities were dis-
proportionately targeted as sites for environmentally 
damaging activities (Bernauer et al. 2013; Homer-Dixon 
1994; Koopmans and Rucht 2002). Marginal groups 
were involved in one-third of the cases of nonviolent 
responses to protest; a high figure given that the groups 
usually represented a small fraction of the country’s 
general population. When examining the involvement 
Fig. 2 Violence by industry type
Fig. 3 Violent repression of grassroots environmental protests from 1965 to 1980 (n = 175). Geographical regions are categorized according to 
designations by the United Nations
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of marginalized groups in protests that were violently 
repressed, the figure rises to 60 %.
Most troubling was the combined effect of industry 
and marginalized victims. A large majority of the violent 
repression of environmental protests in the extractive 
industries of logging, mining, and petroleum involved 
marginalized groups (100, 86, and 75  %, respectively). 
Violent repression of dam-related protests also targeted 
marginal communities, and 68 % of these cases involved 
marginal groups.
The interaction between regime type and violence 
against marginal groups was perhaps opposite from what 
might have been expected by the literature, which sug-
gests that marginal groups are more vulnerable in non-
democratic countries than in democratic ones (Downey 
et al. 2010; Adeola 2000; Franklin 2009). Although dem-
ocratic countries overall experienced lower rates of vio-
lent repression of protests, those cases where violent 
repression did occur nearly always targeted marginalized 
groups (Fig.  5). In the democracies of North America 
and Oceania in particular, 100 % of violent repression of 
peaceful environmental protests involved marginalized 
groups.
This finding refines and complicates the environmen-
tal justice literature that holds that marginal groups in 
poor, nondemocratic countries are the most vulnerable 
to violent repression (Adeola 2000; Salehyan et al. 2012). 
Our findings support the vulnerability of marginalized 
groups in poor and nondemocratic countries—three of 
the four cases where death tolls exceeded one hundred 
people occurred in nondemocratic countries; all of them 
related to extractive industries funded with international 
funding. However, our findings also suggest that violence 
against marginal groups engaging in environmental pro-
tests is a very serious problem for all countries, irrespec-
tive of political regime type. While only one-third of the 
cases of violence in nondemocratic countries involved 
marginalized groups (6 of 18 cases), 63  % of violence 
in free countries involved marginalized groups (17 of 
27 cases), and 76  % of violence in partly free countries 
involved marginalized groups (Fig. 5).
Although international funding was not statistically 
significant in our model, it was strongly associated with 
the most extreme cases of violence. In the dataset there 
were only ten cases where the violence involved more 
than five deaths, making them relatively rare events, 
which are difficult to analyze statistically (King and Zeng 
2001). In all ten of those cases local people were protest-
ing the extraction of natural resources, and in all but 
one of the cases international money was supporting the 
project (Table 3). Furthermore, once again marginalized 
communities were disproportionately targeted; in nine of 
Fig. 4 Nonviolent response to grassroots environmental protests from 1965 to 1980 (n = 175). Geographical regions are categorized according to 
designations by the United Nations
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the ten cases of extreme violence victims came from mar-
ginalized groups.
In this small subset of cases, where violence resulted in 
the death of between five and five thousand individuals, 
violence was extensive and culpability was complex. In 
most cases, the local government or its agents were the 
direct perpetuators of the violence, but the disputed pro-
ject involved significant international funding that influ-
enced the decision to repress the protesters with violence. 
Some of these cases are well known and well-researched, 
such as the massacre of Ogoni people in Nigeria in the 
early 1990s as their protest against petroleum projects 
in their area expanded into broader demands for self-
determination. Other cases that resulted in intermediate 
numbers of deaths are less well known, such as the 1990 
‘Christmas Massacre’ in Bolivia where 11 miners were 
killed when government forces gave the miner’s union 
occupying a tin mine a scant fifteen-minute warning 
before they open fired.
Although not statistically significant, international 
funding was disproportionately found in the cases of vio-
lent repression across the dataset (it was present in 29 % 
of the nonviolent cases but 45 % of cases where the pro-
tests were violently repressed). Furthermore, when inter-
national funding was coupled with an extractive industry, 
the chances of violence rose dramatically. International 
funding was involved in a large majority of the projects 
that elicited violence in the mining (78  %) and petro-
leum (100  %) industries. Of the industries that spurred 
primarily nonviolent responses to protests, most of the 
isolated incidents of violent repression that did occur in 
these industries also involved international funding: wind 
energy (100 %), chemical plants (50 %), development pro-
jects (50  %), and waste disposal (40  %). These findings 
support scholarship that argues that extractive indus-
tries funded by international capital are prone to violence 
(Downey et al. 2010). They also suggest that international 
funding may increase the propensity of violence even 
in industries that are not extractive and not ordinarily 
prone to violence.
Conclusions
This study represents the first comprehensive worldwide 
assessment of violent repression of grassroots environ-
mental protests. Our findings demonstrate that violence 
against peaceful environmental protesters is not just a 
problem in poor, nondemocratic countries. Violence 
against peaceful environmental protesters occurred most 
frequently when communities that included marginal-
ized groups protested natural resource extraction in their 
community.
Previous studies of environmental justice have frequently 
argued that enhancing the socio-economic standing of 
victims and potential victims is the best way to combat 
Fig. 5 Percent of violent repression that involved marginalized groups
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violence (Roberts and Ash 2009; McGurty 1997; Aldrich 
2008; Rabe 1994; Giugni 2004; Ash et al. 2009). Our find-
ings support this common recommendation: disrespect of 
fundamental human rights and low per capita income were 
the two most significant factors increasing the likelihood 
that any given grassroots environmental protest would be 
violently repressed. However, these two policy recommen-
dations are vague, broad, and difficult to implement.
Our findings that victims of violence are most com-
monly found in communities containing marginalized 
groups and the frequent involvement of international 
funding in cases of violent repression enables us to refine 
our policy recommendations. We recommend that sus-
tainable development initiatives targeting local commu-
nities be built into the project plans for internationally 
funded development projects, especially when those pro-
jects are related to extractive industries. These initiatives 
would involve integration of local communities into the 
governance structures present at the site of the project, 
building economic frameworks that create jobs and eco-
nomic opportunities for the community during and after 
the project takes place, and extensive plans for environ-
mental mitigation of any harm caused by the project. 
These locally focused sustainable development initia-
tives should be created for all projects, not just for those 
located in poor countries.
The process of working with local communities to 
ensure that the development project minimizes its effects 
on the local population and mitigates its environmen-
tal damage, will help create the ‘social license’ necessary 
for the development to proceed smoothly (Gunningham 
et al. 2004; Prno and Slocombe 2012). Creating govern-
ance structures that engage local stakeholders early and 
establish clear grievance procedures can reduce the 
likelihood that local community members will protest a 
given project and also reduce the likelihood of violence 
if protests do emerge (Holliday and Yep 2005; Lemos and 
Agrawal 2006). Industry now has many decades of expe-
rience incorporating sustainable development initiatives 
into large-scale development projects as a component 
of their risk management and CSR initiatives (Breshears 
et  al. 2005; Castka and Balzarova 2008); http://www.
commdev.org). Furthermore, international governmen-
tal organizations such as the United Nations and the 
World Bank have developed comprehensive frameworks 
for incorporating sustainable development practices into 
both business development models as well as local and 
national regulatory frameworks (Ruggie 2008, 2011). The 
International Finance Corporation’s CommDev (Com-
mdev.org) website has an extensive repository of practical 
information related to incorporating sustainable develop-
ment into project plans, including a Financial Valuation 
Table 3 Characteristics of protest cases where more than five deaths occurred as a result of the protest
Nine of the ten cases had funding with international money and nine of the ten cases also involved marginalized groups
Protest case Deaths International 
funding












6 Alcoa, Vale 
(mining)
Brazil Conservation Hydroelectric 
power






6 No Indonesia Pollution Paper mill Southeast 
Asia














20 BHP Billiton Philippines Conservation Mining Southeast 
Asia
Yes 2005 8 Partly free







Colombia Conservation Petroleum Latin America Yes 1992 13 Partly free
Shell Oil Ogoni 
Protest
2000 Shell Oil Nigeria Pollution Petroleum Africa Yes 1992 21 Not free
Chixoy Dam in 
Rio Negro
5000 World Bank 
IADB
Guatemala Conservation Hydroelectric 
power
Latin America Yes 1982 31 Not free
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Tool, which helps firms and investors estimate the finan-
cial return on site-specific sustainability investments. 
These industry and international organization-developed 
tools also offer guidelines for appropriate ways to com-
pensate individuals and communities who are displaced 
by large-scale projects, which is another important ele-
ment in the efforts to eliminate violence related to these 
projects.
Responsible corporations and industries are already 
incorporating local sustainability initiatives into their 
business models. Industrial groups need to become 
more active in disseminating the best practice models 
that they have developed, increasing the pressure on 
non-compliant firms to raise their standards. Govern-
ments, both local and national, should support indus-
try efforts by supporting the projects of corporations 
that incorporate local sustainable development into 
their project plans and rejecting projects that do not. 
Nonprofit and advocacy organizations concerned about 
human rights and environmental sustainability as well 
can help support local sustainability initiatives in com-
munities that host extractive industry development 
projects. Local sustainability should be actively incorpo-
rated into large-scale development projects, especially 
when those projects are taking place in communities 
that contain marginalized people. Promoting local sus-
tainability as part of development projects will not only 
enhance environmental outcomes, it will also help pre-
vent tragic human rights abuses that have, unfortunately, 
been a common outgrowth of extractive industry pro-
jects around the world.
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